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### **NATO IN AFGHANISTAN** **MASTER NARRATIVE AS AT 6 October 2008**

This guidance document is designed to assist all those who play a part in explaining the situation in Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, but especially those who deal with the media. Ownership of this document is shared between NATO HQ, SHAPE, JFC Brunssum and HQ ISAF but certain issues should be led at the strategic level (NATO HQ /SHAPE); these are annotated as such. The Current Issues section will be updated according to the level of Alliance or public interest at the time of issue.

***For ease of identification, major additions/amendments to the 18 September 2008 edition are highlighted.***

#### **Headline Messages**

- Afghanistan remains NATO's number one priority. This is not an operation of choice, it is one of necessity. We are in Afghanistan for the long term under a United Nations mandate for as long as we are needed and welcomed by the Afghan people.
- The significant increase in security incidents this year is due to an increased use of asymmetric tactics by insurgents, an increase in the operational presence of ISAF and ANSF, and an increased freedom of action for insurgents operating from inside Pakistan. Pakistan must be part of a regional solution to the challenges faced in Afghanistan. NATO/ISAF is strengthening political contacts with Pakistan and increasing military cooperation through tripartite meetings at all levels, an enhanced ISAF-Pakistan Liaison Team, and practical coordination measures.
- The Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF are making progress on the ground. The militants<sup>1</sup> do not and cannot hold ground where they are challenged by ANSF and ISAF.

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<sup>1</sup> Opposing Militant Forces is the correct term but is not suitable for use with the media. Depending on the audience and the group being referred to, the phrases militants/insurgents/extremists/Taleban extremists/enemies of Afghanistan may be used, see also para 36.

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- The Afghan National Army is a significant success story. It continues to grow in number, competence, and capabilities and is approved to grow to 122,000 by 2012<sup>2</sup>. Today, the majority of operations involving the ANA are Afghan-led.
- Progress in security is sustainable only with progress in all three fields of the Afghan National Development Strategy. Good governance, including the rule of law and human rights, together with economical and social development require the coordinated effort of the International Community with ever increasing Afghan ownership.
- To minimise the risk of harming civilians COM ISAF has mandated his forces to take all measures deemed necessary to avoid the loss of life. These include directions on using airpower. A new methodology of civilian casualty reporting has also been established.
- Within means and capabilities, ISAF is supporting ANSF planning, coordinating and executing security for the voter registration process during the period of October 2008 to February 2009. ISAF will provide third-line security, backing up the Afghan National Police and Army in supporting this Afghan-led process. A security plan was signed by the chairman of the Afghan Independent Election Commission along with representatives from the MoI, MoD, and ISAF on 24 Aug 08.
- ISAF's next phased operations plan, Operation TOLO, will commence on November 1 and will run through April 1. It will build on the current Operation SHAMSHIR and will advance our shape, clear, hold, and build strategy by focusing efforts on key population areas and infrastructure, securing the population and separating the insurgency from it.

**Public Affairs Guidance - Key Points**

- Public Affairs Officers should be aware of upcoming national debates. Notwithstanding, NATO/ISAF PAO should avoid any comments on positions presented in those debates. Questions regarding national commitments should be referred to SHAPE and NATO HQ.
- Messaging on the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) for ISAF should focus on efforts to bolster ANA capabilities through the provision of more OMLTs and not speculate on possible future revisions of the CJSOR.

**NOTE to PAO:** If pressed, reference to force capability deficiencies rather than estimated numbers should be made. In general, issues concerning force generation should not be debated in public.

Commanders should use the chain of command to request more troops, not the media.

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<sup>2</sup> Approved by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board IX held in Kabul, Afghanistan on 10 Sep 08. The figure 122,000 refers to operational units. The overall figure including trainers, enablers, etc. will reach 134,000.

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- It is important to emphasize that our actions are in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA)<sup>3</sup>. To this end, every opportunity should be taken to enable the Afghan authorities to articulate successes to the public.
- NATO does not use body counts as a measure of success.

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<sup>3</sup> Afghan officials refer to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This should be reflected when referring to the Government, particularly when addressing Afghan audiences.

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**SECTION I - CURRENT ISSUES**

**1. Characterisation of the Security Situation**

- As expected, the number of engagements with militants in the South and East has increased as ANSF and ISAF are operating in greater numbers and in areas they have not been in before.
- Militants are adapting their tactics and relying increasingly on asymmetric methods such as IEDs, terror attacks on softer targets and intimidation of innocent civilians.
- The North, West and Capital regions are generally calm and have been for well over 15 months. Occasional, though dramatic, incidents do not change this overall picture.
- The security situation as of mid 2008 is characterized as follows:
  - o Violence continues at high levels
  - o ANSF/ISAF continue to push into regions previously controlled by the insurgents

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- o Change in tactics by the insurgents to attacks on more vulnerable targets and greater use of asymmetric techniques
- o Increase in incidents, due in part to extremist sanctuaries across the border in Pakistan.

**2. Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility**

*(More details – MOC Media Lines MOC(2008)ML0007)*

*Transfer of lead security responsibility for Kabul to ANSF was initially announced by President Karzai at NATO Bucharest Summit in Apr 08.*

- Transfer of lead security responsibility will build on the achievements of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and NATO/ISAF. It is evidence to the Afghan people that their Government and security forces are increasingly credible and capable.
- This is a process which is conditions-based, not time driven.
- The process is driven by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Government is planning and executing the transfer of responsibility with NATO/ISAF supporting their efforts.
- The transfer commenced with Kabul City District.
- Transfer of lead security responsibility in Kabul does not mean NATO/ISAF will depart from the area. NATO/ISAF will continue to partner with ANSF in the outlying districts and remain ready to reinforce ANSF in the city should it be required. It will remain partnered with Kabul City Police and the Headquarters Security and Support Brigade of the ANA.
- NATO is committed to stay as long as it takes to achieve our objectives. We are committed for the long term to ensure a peaceful, stable and secure AFG.

**3. Civilian Casualties / Human Rights**

*ISAF takes all possible measure to protect innocent civilians and their property.*

*In general:*

- The ISAF mission is to support the Afghan Authorities and to provide a secure and stable environment to allow for the expansion of governance and development.
- ISAF serves at the invitation of the GIRoA and for the people of Afghanistan and is mindful of the need to maintain the confidence of the people it serves.
- ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) make every effort to minimise the risk of any damage, injury or loss of life to civilians in the course of their operations in Afghanistan. However, ISAF reserves the right to protect its own personnel.
- All ISAF soldiers operate under agreed Rules of Engagement (ROE) to minimise the risk of civilian casualties.
- COM ISAF has issued a Tactical Directive that places a priority on further reducing civilian casualties.
- An ISAF Post Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF) has been developed to address immediate post-operation requirements. A growing number of nations have pledged money to it. It is a valuable instrument in the hands of COM ISAF.

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NATO/ISAF is constantly reviewing its tactics, techniques and procedures to prevent civilian casualties and demonstrate our respect for Afghan culture without undermining the operational effectiveness or diminishing the right to self-defence.

- Under ISAF Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) any credible claim of the death of civilians is to be immediately investigated.
- ISAF has implemented rigorous investigation procedures. When NATO/ISAF does cause civilian casualties or property damage we will accept responsibility.
- To the contrary,
  - o Militants deliberately target innocent civilians with suicide attacks and IEDs.
  - o Militants forcefully oppose efforts to improve the life of the Afghan people and it is they who must be held responsible for bringing violence to the Afghan people.
  - o Militants deliberately force civilians into situations where they are either killed or are at risk of being harmed by NATO/ISAF or coalition forces in order to undermine support for NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan and in the International Community.
  - o Militants tactics are to launch attacks from civilian areas, retreat to civilian areas and use civilians as human shields. Militants want civilians caught up in the fighting, because they think this will undermine support for NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan and in the international community and weaken the legitimate Afghan government.
  - o Civilian deaths caused by militants have escalated significantly, reflecting their increasing use of indiscriminate tactics such as suicide bombs and IEDs. This year ISAF records indicate that militant forces have killed more than 350 Afghans and wounded a further 800. The Human Rights Watch report *Troops in Contact – Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan* published in August 2008 stresses that “Taliban and other insurgents continue to be responsible for more civilian casualties than US and NATO forces.”

*In detail:*

- NATO/ISAF values the life of every single person. NATO/ISAF’s strategy as well as its tactics reflects this fundamental difference with the militants.
- That is why NATO/ISAF has its procedures under constant review; that is why NATO/ISAF undertakes rigorous and constant investigations to learn the right lessons; that is why NATO/ISAF will work even more closely with the Afghans, whom they are there to defend. Constant review of tactics, techniques and procedures in the light of the opponent’s conduct is key to success.
- For his part SACEUR has mandated to:
  - o produce enhanced and timely After Action Reviews to identify lessons learned
  - o establish a stronger system of reporting from investigations when deemed necessary
  - o look for additional opportunities to involve Afghan official and other partners, including UNAMA in investigations
- To minimise the risk of harming civilians and reduce behaviour which offends Afghans COMISAF has revised his Tactical Directive:
  - o To partner with ANSF in all ISAF operations.
  - o To make no uninvited entry into an Afghan house, mosque, historical or religious site unless there is a clear and identified danger.

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- o To demonstrate respect and consideration for Afghans, their culture, their customs, and Islam. To avoid insults, offensive gestures, unnecessary pointing of weapons, and reckless driving.
- o To demonstrate proportionality, restraint, and utmost discrimination in the use of firepower -- making greatest possible use of precision systems.
- o When taking fire from an Afghan house, on-scene commanders must satisfy themselves that every effort has been made to confirm that the Afghan facility does not shelter innocent civilians.
- o To set the conditions to minimize the use of deadly force in Escalation of Force procedures against civilians through tactics, techniques, procedures and training.
- o To acknowledge civilian casualties immediately and transparently investigate allegations rapidly.
- To establish a transparent methodology of civilian casualty reporting COM ISAF:
  - o established a civilian casualties tracking cell monitoring incidents
  - o systemized recording of allegations as well as resulting rebuttals and admissions
  - o developed a two-tiered system of checking the validity of the allegation and conducting the actual investigation if the allegation was substantiated
  - o enhanced battle-damage assessments at Regional Command level
  - o defined modalities for improved ISAF HQ interaction with UNAMA on casualty reporting, in relation to the existing Regional Command – UNAMA interaction.
- ISAF is aware of differing assessments on the number of civilian casualties from different stakeholders. We have had constructive meetings with UNAMA with an aim to reconcile differing methodologies and set up firmer basis for cooperation.

**4. Use of Airpower**

- Airpower in Afghanistan is used:
  - o in support of ground forces, with specific need and in specific situations
  - o on positively identified (P-I-D) enemy firing positions
  - o upon request and approval by the ground commander.
- Airpower is vital to the defence of Afghanistan because:
  - o it provides speed, maneuverability and range
  - o the terrain impedes maneuver of troops and supplies
  - o the remoteness of locations hampers the use of ground forces
  - o it provides the most precise power projection available.
- Airpower is employed by ISAF under the strictest possible restrictions—if there is any reason to believe there are civilians present a strike will not occur.

**5. NATO Support to the Afghan National Army (ANA)**

*The provision of direct support to the ANA is one of NATO/ISAF's key military tasks. NATO/ISAF has now fought alongside the ANA and is committed to providing continued direct support to it, through mentoring, training and equipment support.*

- Building an effective ANA is critical to building a self-sustaining Afghanistan.

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- The US is the G8 lead nation for the development of the ANA and very significant progress has been made; further work is required to strengthen ANA mobility, combat support and combat service support.
- NATO's involvement with the ANA focuses more on its employment than its manning, initial training and sustenance. NATO assists the GIRoA to bring the ANA up to operating capability through the provision of Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT).
- OMLTs provide a bridge from the collective training received in the Kabul Military Training Centre to field training. This training across the full spectrum of ANA unit activities includes ANA garrison functions and operational deployments. OMLTs deploy on operations in an advisory role.
- OMLTs provide the critically important conduit for liaison and command and control between ANA units and nearby ISAF/Coalition forces, while providing the ANA with essential combat enablers.
- As of September 2008, NATO has fielded 36 OMLTs, a shortfall of 23 from the 59 currently required. The Alliance is working to increase this number significantly to accommodate the proposed increases in the ANA. (These numbers do not reflect the non-ISAF U.S. commitments)
- The Afghan National Army is truly a "national" institution representing the entire country.
- The ANA is growing in strength and capability every day. As of August 2008, the ANA is manned at over 66,000 (83%) personnel, many of whom are conducting operations side by side with ISAF forces.
- For the remainder of 2008, it is planned to increase the monthly training output from approximately 2,000 to 4,000. The authorized strength of the ANA has been increased to approximately 70,000 in 2008, with additional increases planned to 80,000 by 2009, and 122,000 by 2013.
- The Afghan MoD has proposed expanding the ANA to 122,000 by 2013. This expansion will require increases in the ISAF OMLT commitment, forecasts and plans of which are currently under development.
- Successes in combat operations in which the ANA participated in a leading role encompass all five ANA Corps. As of September 2008, ANA is involved in over 70% of all ISAF operations and has led the planning and execution of 60% of the 200+ planned operations this year.
- Additional OMLT requirements are being reviewed to address the planned increase of the ANA to 122,000.
- The establishment of an ANA Air Corps (ANAAC) has further contributed to the overall capability of the ANA.
- Since January 2008, ANAAC Cargo lift has increased from 9,000 Kg to 37,450 Kg in July. Sorties have increased from 107 total FW/RW to 695 in July, while passenger lift increased from 2,368 to 8,513 in the same period.
- In 2008, four Mi-17s, six Mi-35s, and 2 An-32s are being delivered, and the ANAAC have conducted their first fixed-wing and point-of-injury MEDEVAC flights.

**ANA Trust Fund**

- o Established to cover the transportation and installation cost of the equipment donations, the purchase of equipment, the purchase of services for engineering and construction projects, and in/out-of-country training.

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Contributions as of 5 Sep 08

	<b>Donated</b>	Used	<b>Remaining</b>
Total	7,118,593 Euro	2,338,299 Euro	4,780,296 Euro balance
Transportation	1,338,299 Euro	1,338,299 Euro	0*
Purchase of Equipment	5,104,295 Euro	1,000,000 Euro	<b>4,104,295 Euro</b>
Training	100,000 Euro		<b>100,000 Euro</b>
Infrastr. & Engineering	576,000 Euro		<b>576,000 Euro</b>

- o The zero transportation balance is critical because none of the donations can be shipped to Afghanistan. For example, the Czech Republic has graciously donated six transport helicopters. There is no funding available to ship these to the ANA.

**6. Kajaki Dam Project**

In a unique joint operation, the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF successfully delivered a new turbine to Kajaki Dam in Helmand province. The project, supported by the GIRoA, is one part of the international community's effort towards redevelopment in the southern region. The result will be a much needed increase in capacity to generate electrical power.

**7. ISAF support to Voter Registration and Elections**

- Presidential and Provincial Council elections are scheduled for mid-August 2009, with parliamentary elections set for mid-September 2010.
- The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) is planning for the elections in conjunction with the Afghan National Security Forces as the leading security force. ISAF is supporting, within means and capabilities, ANSF planning, coordinating and executing security for the voter registration process during the period of October 2008 to February 2009 timeframe. The basic concept is that ISAF will provide third-line security, backing up the Afghan National Police and Army in supporting this Afghan-led process. A security plan was signed by the chairman of the Afghan Independent Election Commission along with representatives from the MoI, MoD, and ISAF on 24 Aug 08.

**8. AWACS capability in support of ISAF**

- The provision of the AWACS capability for the ISAF mission was requested by COM ISAF. SACEUR has supported this request and recommended the deployment of NATO AWACS in support of ISAF.
- There is a requirement to help control the increasing amount of air traffic there and ensure flight safety for both military and civilian aircraft. The NATO AWACS is one possible means of providing such a capability.
- NAC approval is required for the deployment of AWACS outside of NATO territory. NATO's political authorities will consider this potential employment of AWACS for ISAF once a

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consolidated military advice from the Military Committee is received. The process is likely to take several weeks.

**9. The Role of Pakistan**

*'Increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan's neighbours, especially Pakistan' is one of the four guiding principles laid down in the strategic vision statement for the ISAF mission as agreed at the Bucharest Summit by NATO Heads of State and/or Government in April 2008.*

*NATO/ISAF recognizes the desire of the democratically-elected Government of Pakistan to come to negotiated agreements with militants. NATO/ISAF is concerned, however, that any agreements should not contribute to a deterioration of security inside Afghanistan.*

*NATO/ISAF fully respects the sovereignty of Pakistan. NATO/ISAF has every right, however, to address issues which might diminish security in Afghanistan, and put its military and civilian personnel at risk.*

*Besides its political contacts with Pakistan, NATO continues to engage in military to military contacts in the framework of the Tripartite Commission, in which ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan are represented. NATO/ISAF is currently enhancing its military liaison presence in Pakistan to strengthen communication and coordination. Whatever happens in Pakistan, efforts to curtail cross-border support to insurgents must continue.*

*Pakistan also plays an important role in the logistics support of the ISAF mission. Land lines of communication through Pakistan are used extensively by ISAF nations, and NATO is working with the Pakistani authorities to finalize a Transit Agreement.*

- Afghanistan and Pakistan are confronted by a common enemy that does not respect the border. The cross-border movement of this enemy is a particular concern that makes constructive engagement between Afghanistan, Pakistan and ISAF essential.
- President Karzai and President Zardari have vowed to work together towards durable peace.
- MOFA Spanta and MOFA Qureshi announced an agreement to hold joint mini jirga in early October in Islamabad.
- Military coordination is primarily pursued through the **Tripartite Commission**, comprising senior military representatives from Pakistan, Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF.
- In August COMISAF, GEN Bismullah Khan (ANA CSA), GEN Kayani (PAK CSA) held the first Tripartite meeting since Nov 2007 in Bagram, Afghanistan and agreed to continue to meet.
- Its four main areas of cooperation are intelligence sharing, border security, counter IED and information operations initiatives. Practical joint coordination measures and procedures have been added as the primary focus.
- Progress is being made in initiating joint border patrols and in improving cooperation at the tactical level.
- A **Tripartite** Joint Intelligence Operations Centre (**T-JIOC**), located within HQ ISAF in Kabul, has been established and staffed jointly by officers from the ANA, Pakistan Army and ISAF.-

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- The first joint border coordination centre (BCC) was inaugurated in the Torkham (Khyber) area on 29 March 2008. The next two BCCs are being constructed at Lwara Pass in Paktika and Nawa Pass in Kunar (TBC this calendar year).
- NATO and the Allies are aware of the volatile security situation in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Province. The number of cross border incursions from Pakistan to Afghanistan continues to be monitored.  
**Only if pressed:** ISAF forces are frequently fired at from inside Pakistan, very close to the border. In some cases defensive fire is required, against specific threats. Wherever possible, such fire is pre-coordinated with the Pakistani military.
- NATO calls on Afghanistan's neighbours to act resolutely in support of the Afghan Government's efforts to build a stable Afghanistan with secure borders.
- NATO looks forward to deepening the engagement with Afghanistan's neighbours, particularly Pakistan.
- NATO/ISAF is currently enhancing its liaison arrangements in Pakistan to strengthen coordination and communication with Pakistan's military authorities.
- NATO and the Pakistani Government are continuing their discussions on the development of a transit agreement which will formalize arrangements whereby Allies and other nations participating in ISAF to transport equipment to the ISAF theatre through Pakistan's territory.

**10. Launch of Operation TOLO**

*OP TOLO will begin on 1 November 2008 and will consolidate and build on the achievements of OP SHAMSHIR. It is an ISAF/ANSF framework operation under which focused security operations will be conducted in conjunction with wider R&D, as well as governance activities. ISAF will operate in partnership with the ANSF and International Community to synchronise efforts across all lines of operation.*

- During OP TOLO, ISAF/ANSF operations will aim at isolating/separating the insurgents from AFG popular support. It also aims to degrade insurgent capability and increase support to GIRoA, ANSF and ISAF among the AFG population.
- OP TOLO aims at expanding GIRoA governance. During OP TOLO, the GIRoA will further implement progressive sub-national governance to support coordinated and focused reconstruction efforts.
- ISAF will build ANSF capacity and capability by developing flexible and continuous planning cycles that take advantage of the ANSF involvement in the planning and execution of focused operations. This will promote continued close partnership with the ANA to develop their ability to plan and lead independent counter insurgency operations.
- ISAF support to develop the ANP will enable it to mature into a capable and credible force able to exercise responsibility for local and border security. This is essential to enabling GIRoA and international community support for coordinated and focused R&D. ISAF will continue to complement and support ANP in selected areas within our focused operations.

**11. US Command and Control (C2) arrangements**

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- We/NATO/ISAF have noted the US decision to appoint GEN McKiernan as Commander, US Forces Afghanistan.
- We welcome this initiative which will enhance coordination between international military forces in Afghanistan and thus enable us to work more closely and effectively in support of the ANSF.
- This decision neither changes the ISAF mandate, nor merges the ISAF mission with the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. As US authorities have stated, OEF will continue to conduct counter-terrorism (CT) and detention operations under a separate mandate. The change of US C2 arrangements do not bring CT and detention operations under GEN McKiernan or ISAF.
- This amendment to the command relationships will enable the ANA operational mentoring element of the ISAF mission and the OEF-led ANA training mission under Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to work even more closely and effectively. This will be increasingly important as the ANA grows in size and capacity.
- In addition, US forces under OEF regularly provide support to ANSF and ISAF forces as they conduct security operations across the country. This decision will enable GEN McKiernan to coordinate and direct all these forces more effectively.

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**SECTION II – ENDURING ISSUES**

**12. NATO/ISAF Mission**

*In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO/ISAF's mission is to help create a secure and stable environment for the people of Afghanistan.*

- NATO's strategic objectives are the extension of government authority across Afghanistan; the development of the Afghan Government structures necessary to maintain security across the country without the assistance of international forces; the establishment of a stable and secure environment in which sustainable R&D has taken hold; and the promotion by the Afghan Government of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
- The NATO-led ISAF mission is to assist the GIRoA in the establishment and maintenance of a secure and stable environment, with full engagement of ANSF, in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan's reconstruction and stability.
- ISAF shall work in conjunction with the international community in an integrated approach to advance the three pillars of security, governance, and development as specified in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). ISAF will lead the security effort and will support the governance and development efforts.
- To carry out this mission, ISAF will conduct security and stability operations in coordination with Afghan security forces and will provide support to the Government and International Community in Security Sector Reform, including mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Army.
- NATO/ISAF, within its means and capabilities, will assist the Afghan National Police and provide support to the Afghan Authorities with their National Drug Control Strategy, as well as security assistance to judicial reform initiatives. This will be done in close coordination and consultation with the EU and the respective G8 Partner Nations, mainly the US and Germany as key partner nations in the Police Sector Reform.
- NATO/ISAF's Rules of Engagement are robust and entirely appropriate for the challenges faced.
- NATO has the strategy and forces to succeed over time.  
**If asked:** However, we could achieve the mission much faster and more efficiently with more. To that end we are constantly re-assessing the capabilities required to achieve the political goal and to mitigate any shortfalls.

**13. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)**

*The US-led Coalition continues to operate under OEF authorities. There are three primary areas of operation which include training and equipping of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, contributing to Afghanistan's R&D, and conducting counter-terrorism operations. OEF operates under a separate mandate to that of ISAF.*

- ISAF and OEF forces maintain close coordination and deconfliction to maintain the distinction and mutual support between the two missions.

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**14. NATO - Afghanistan Strategic Relationship**

*NATO has developed a programme of cooperation with Afghanistan, aimed at building a partnership-type cooperation to complement ISAF's operational role. This programme is yet further evidence of NATO's enduring commitment to Afghanistan.*

- The Joint NATO-Afghanistan Declaration was signed on 6 Sept 2006 by NATO Secretary General and President Karzai in Kabul.
- The programme works under the guiding principle of Afghan ownership. It will be closely coordinated with other relevant international actors.
- The cooperation programme focuses on defence reform, including but not limited to, democratic control of the armed forces, defence planning and interoperability. NATO now has considerable experience to share with Afghanistan in this field.

**15. ANA Donation Programme (as of August 2008)**

NATO equipment donations programme in support of the ANA started in summer 2006 building on previous achievements on bilateral basis.

NATO works in support of the G8 lead nation (USA) sponsoring the overall ANA training and equipping programme through Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

SHAPE coordinates equipment donations on behalf of ISAF contributing nations.

**Equipment donations completed:**

Bulgaria	mortars and ammunition
Canada	small arms, ammunition and equipment
Czech Republic	helicopters
Estonia	small arms and ammunition
Finland	field telephones and generators
Germany	blankets, clothing and equipment
Hungary	small arms and ammunition
Lithuania	ammunition
Luxemburg	individual body armour and helmets
Montenegro	small arms and ammunition
Slovenia	small arms, mortars and ammunition
Switzerland	fire trucks, spares and training
Turkey	howitzers and ammunition, clothing equipment and military academy supplies

Further offers of equipment are under consideration by: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Romania, United Kingdom.

**16. Ongoing Operations – Operation SHAMSHIR**

*ISAF will sustain its operations over the coming months. With the forces available now, and arriving in theatre in future months, ISAF will build upon its previous successes. Although the insurgents remain a tactical threat in the South and the East, with continued NATO/ISAF and*

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*ANSF engagement they do not pose an overall threat to the country.*

*Operation Shamshir (or 'Longsword') is the name given to the overarching operational framework for ISAF and ANSF operations from March 2008 onward.*

- o Op Shamshir is the follow-on framework operation to operations Now Ruz and Pamir.
- o The focus of Op Shamshir is to maintain pressure on the militants in order to interrupt their ability to re-arm, re-equip and re-group during the upcoming period.
- o Op Shamshir will support the further expansion of GIRoA governance and further separate the militants from the population.
- o Op Shamshir is an ISAF-ANSF framework operation under which focused security operations will be conducted in conjunction with wider R&D, as well as governance activities.
- o Op Shamshir, like Ops Now Ruz and Pamir before, will allow NATO/ISAF to continue to focus on the provision of security in order to permit reconstruction and development to take place..
- o Op Shamshir is a combined ISAF-ANSF operation. The Afghan Ministry of Defence was fully involved in its planning and will participate throughout the conduct of the operation.

**17. The Role of Iran**

*The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan maintain diplomatic relations. Both the GIRoA and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran repeatedly indicated that they will pursue the development of stable and trustful relations.*

- Weapons with Iranian markings have been intercepted on Afghan territory.
- NATO/ISAF has no direct evidence of Iranian government involvement.
- NATO/ISAF is monitoring the situation.

**18. The Role of the Russian Federation**

*ISAF-related United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 encourages "neighbouring States and other Member States to provide to ISAF such necessary assistance as may be requested, including the provision of over flight clearances and transit".*

- Discussions between NATO and the Russian Federation are taking place in the framework of UNSCR 1386 and subsequent resolutions, and under the umbrella of the NATO-RUSSIA Council (NRC).
- The main elements of these discussions are arrangements for air and land transit of ISAF-bound (not just NATO) non-lethal military equipment (not personnel) through the Russian Federation in support of the ISAF mission, as well as further cooperation to train police and counter-narcotics officers from Afghanistan and Central Asia in Russia and Central Asia.

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- Discussions are still ongoing and have not been affected by the state of NATO-Russia relationship. Both NATO and the Russian Federation have an interest in a stable and secure Afghanistan.
- While Russia's offer was formalized at the Bucharest Summit in April 08, NATO or ISAF contributors have not yet had a possibility to avail themselves of it, given the need for similar arrangements to be in place with Central Asian partners which are also on the Northern route to AFG. NATO continues its consultation with the transit states concerned (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan).

**NOTE:**

- Any talk of stationing or deploying Russian military assets in Afghanistan is out of the question and has never been the subject of any considerations.
- Nothing will take place on the territory of Afghanistan that has not been discussed with and agreed by GIRoA.

**19. Afghan National Police (ANP)**

*Police reform is one of the most critical issues for Afghanistan's security and stability and even greater efforts are needed in this vital area. Law enforcement is a supporting task for ISAF.*

- The overall development of the ANP continues to lag behind that of the ANA although it is trending upwards. The current staffing plan of the MoI allows for 82,000 ANP.
- The Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) was introduced in some high risk provinces as a temporary structure and extended until 1 October 2008 to be absorbed as appropriate in the ANP after that time, see also para 14.
- The high number of ANP casualties – in 2007 more than 1,000 ANP were killed in action and 1,400 wounded (source: Spokesperson AFG MoI) - underlines the urgent need for better training, equipment and tactical employment.
- ANP presence and policing performance need to be strengthened and the infrastructure by which pay and benefits are administered must be improved.
- To better coordinate the efforts of the main actors in the field of police reform, the **Combined International Police Coordination Board (IPCB)** was formed. The board consists of representatives of the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), EUPOL, UNAMA and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. It meets once a month under the chairmanship of the Afghan Minister of Interior.
- CSTC-A launched the initiative of **Focused District Development (FDD)** whose main objective is to create secure areas and to build on them. The police corps of selected districts is now undergoing training in Regional Training Centres.
- **Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)**, trained by US International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency (INL) and Germany, replaces the regular police in selected districts on a temporary basis until they complete their training and return with full equipment.
- ANCOP, a 'gendarmierie' type police force, has an authorised strength of 5,365 personnel. 30% have been assigned so far. Eight urban battalions and 11 patrol battalions will be fielded.

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**20. NATO/ISAF Support to Counter Narcotics Activities**

*Counter Narcotics is a law enforcement matter for the Afghan authorities. NATO/ISAF supports the Government's National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS).*

*The security threats presented by the narco-economy, including links between the insurgents and the drugs trade, are evident. Consequently, NATO/ISAF is working to maximize its support to counter narcotics operations in accordance with the provisions of the ROE and the OpPlan. For details see MOC(2007)ML0006 of 28 August 2007 Media Lines on Counter-Narcotics (NATO UNCLASSIFIED, on e-prime WG.7).*

- The GIRoA has the lead on Counter-Narcotics, supported by the G8 lead nation UK.
- The Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) defines four priorities: targeting the trafficker; providing alternative rural livelihoods; reducing demand and developing state institutions.
- NATO/ISAF provides assistance to the Afghan authorities' counter narcotics operations through training, intelligence and logistics, and in-extremis support, as appropriate. NATO/ISAF also helps the Afghan government to explain its counter narcotics policy to its people. If necessary for counter narcotics officials under attack, military support is possible if they are in imminent danger.
- ISAF support of Afghan Government counter narcotics programmes includes:
  - o sharing of counter narcotics information through the Intelligence Fusion Cell, which brings ISAF together with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Afghan authorities and other key international community actors;
  - o developing command and control procedures for effective liaison, co-ordination and deconfliction with the Afghan National Security Forces and the OEF Coalition;
  - o supporting the Government's counter narcotics information campaign with a range of activities, including television and radio advertisements;
  - o training Afghan national security forces;
  - o providing emergency support, such as medical evacuation, to Afghan army forces conducting counter-narcotics operations;
  - o providing logistical support to international community actors, such as the international counter-narcotics agencies, as well as Afghan counter-narcotics personnel and forces.
- NATO is committed to fully implement its counter narcotics tasks as outlined in the current ISAF mandate.
- The UNDOC reported in August that the number of poppy free provinces had increased from 13 in 2007 to 18 (out of 34). The number of poppy-free provinces has increased for the second year running. Opium cultivation has fallen by 19% nationwide, to its lowest level since 2006.
- Counter narcotics experience in other countries shows that it takes a sustained commitment for many years to minimise narcotics production. There is no simple answer to how long the Afghan counter narcotics battle will last.

**21. Comprehensive Approach / Paris Conference**

- Operational experience, particularly in Afghanistan and Kosovo, demonstrates that today's challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community, involving a wide

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spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates, autonomy and decisions of all actors.

- To support a wider comprehensive approach the Alliance is situating its planning and operations in a wider framework, recognizing that the provision of security is linked to the pursuit of good governance and reconstruction and development.
- What is required now is to ensure a greater degree of effective coordination within NATO at all levels, and better co-operation with other actors in order to complement and mutually reinforce each other's efforts to achieve common goals.
- Against this background, NATO Heads of State and Government at the 2006 Riga Summit and re-affirmed at the Bucharest Summit called for the development of pragmatic proposals to improve the coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instruments, as well as practical co-operation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant International Organizations (IO), Non Governmental Organizations (NGO), and local actors in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future operations, wherever appropriate.
- The Paris Conference of 12 June 2008 demonstrated the solid and long-term commitment to Afghanistan of the International Community. The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) embodies the priorities that the Afghans set for themselves to further develop their country in the next five years. This achievement by the Afghans and for the Afghans is a sound example of progress since 2001. It provides a roadmap to fulfilling the vision of the Afghanistan Compact, which remains the basis for our efforts.

**22. Reconstruction and Development (R&D)**

*NATO/ISAF role is to create the security conditions conducive to the R&D efforts of GIRoA, donors and development actors. NATO/ISAF's own R&D efforts are synchronised to support short-term needs and the longer-term strategies and programmes of the GIRoA.*

- NATO/ISAF works with key international players in the development community to facilitate R&D priorities identified by the Afghans themselves. This is done under the auspices of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) towards the objectives laid down in the Afghanistan Compact.
- In exceptional circumstances where other elements of the civilian aid community are unable to provide assistance because of security or logistics constraints, NATO/ISAF may carry out, or commission work, for the benefit of the Afghan people within means and capabilities of assigned forces. In such cases the military forces will be assisted by their own Development Advisers, embedded within PRTs, RCs and HQ ISAF and, security and sensitivity concerns allowing, by members of the development community themselves.
- Every effort is made to ensure there is no unnecessary duplication of effort, that initiatives are in line with GIRoA priorities, that projects respond to the population's needs, are sustainable in the longer term and do not have an adverse effect on the work of other development organisations.
- "There can be no government without an army // no army without money // no money without prosperity // and no prosperity without Justice and good Administration" (This quotation has been taken from the preamble of the ANDS).
- Number of ongoing projects by ANDS sectors are:

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<b>ANDS SECTORS</b>	<b>PRT</b>	<b>NON-PRT</b>
Agriculture and Rural Development	723	8,750
Education	2,191	7,594
Good Governance	922	1,700
Health	756	2,159
Infrastructure and Natural Resources	2,588	24,842
Private Sector Development	298	3,230
Security	794	973
Social Protection	1,596	1,436
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>9,868</b>	<b>50,684</b>

**23. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)**

*PRTs are a key feature of the NATO/ISAF operation.*

- PRTs are a mix of civilian and military personnel whose main purpose is to extend the reach of the GIRoA by helping to facilitate GIRoA Ministries, IOs and NGOs to carry out their assistance programmes to the civilian population.
- A key principle of PRT operations is the need to identify Afghan stakeholders, understand local dynamics, encourage local ownership and seek to build sustainable Afghan capacities by working through and with Afghan authorities.
- The military component focuses on building security sector capacity and increasing stability.
- The civilian component leads on political, economic, humanitarian and social aspects of the PRTs work, supporting the GIRoA's national development priorities.
- There is not a "one size fits all" PRT: they each reflect the prevailing regional circumstances and their lead nation's chosen approach.
- NATO/ISAF is sensitive to the need to distinguish between military and civilian activities, to avoid putting civilian personnel and partners at greater risk. In volatile areas, PRTs are aware of the risks development actors working in local communities might be exposed to if they are too closely associated with military forces; therefore, the PRTs endeavour to maintain a distance between parties.

**24. Emergency Assistance**

- Emergency assistance is that which is life saving and addresses urgent and life threatening humanitarian needs.
- ISAF may be requested to assist with relief supplies. The use of military assets is a last resort.
- ISAF may be called upon to deliver three types of assistance:
  - o Direct - face-to-face distribution of relief goods, providing first aid, transporting victims etc.

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- o Indirect – transporting relief goods, building camps and shelters, providing water sources etc.
- o Infrastructure – repairing infrastructure
- When undertaking any relief supplies, ISAF will coordinate closely with GIRoA authorities and UNAMA to ensure any relief conforms to a provincial needs assessment. Construction will, to the maximum extent possible, conform to the Provincial Development Plan. Assistance following national disasters will be provided in close coordination with the Afghan Natural Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA).
- ISAF SOP for emergency response shows military forces will only respond for *in extremis* support and acknowledges there are only two requesters for emergency support – the National Emergency Response Commission (NERC) and the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC).
- When UNAMA and GIRoA have a reduced or limited provincial presence, PRTs are to coordinate with the closest UNAMA office and be prepared to play a more substantial role in supporting disaster management teams.
- Relief supplies:
  - o Since January 2008, more than 90 tons of relief supplies have been delivered. Efforts were coordinated by ISAF forces, ANSF, UNAMA and respective NGOs all over the country.
  - o In addition, ISAF and ANSF assistance continues through the Medical Civilian Action Programme (MEDCAP).
  - o Veterinary assistance operations are also conducted jointly by ISAF and ANSF to protect livestock through the harsh weather conditions.

**25. Detention Procedures**

*ISAF has effective, transparent and appropriate detention procedures. They reflect the requirements of international law and respect the sovereign responsibilities of Afghanistan.*

- According to NATO procedures ISAF troop contributing nations (TCN) hand over any detainee, within 96 hours, to the appropriate Afghan authorities. Key points are:
  - o ISAF procedures meet appropriate international standards.
  - o The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been consulted extensively in both the formulation and implementation of ISAF Detention Procedures (SOP 362) and is satisfied with this policy.
  - o The ICRC is informed of all detainees taken by ISAF TCN, and is informed if they are handed over to the Afghan Authorities (i.e. there are no “secret” detainees).
  - o Appropriate humanitarian standards are always applied; wounded are treated and detainees are evacuated away from combat zones as soon as is practicable.
- ISAF detention procedures allow, under exceptional circumstances, for transfers to be extended beyond 96 hours, for medical or logistical reasons. Consistent with international law, detainees should also not be transferred under any circumstances in which there is a risk that they may be subjected to torture or other forms of ill treatment.

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- Some TCNs to ISAF have established Memoranda of Understanding with the GIRoA outlining more specific conditions under which they will hand over detainees to the Afghan authorities. NATO does not have such an arrangement and there are no plans to establish one.

**26. Post Operational Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF)**

**NOTE:** *The term "compensation" is inappropriate and should not be used because it brings with it legal implications that do not apply. ISAF makes every effort to minimise the risk of any damage, injury or loss of life to civilians in the course of its operations in Afghanistan. NATO/ISAF deeply regrets the death or injury of any innocent civilian as a result of its operations.*

- As a matter of policy, NATO/ISAF does not compensate for damage or loss occurring during operations. Any claims concerning operational damage and losses are referred by ISAF to the TCN concerned for proper handling, in accordance with their individual national law, policy and procedures.
- NATO/ISAF does make significant efforts to facilitate speedy R&D in those areas affected by ISAF operations.
- The ISAF POHRF has been established to provide rapid humanitarian assistance such as the supply of food, water and shelter, or the repair of buildings or key infrastructure, immediately following sizable ISAF military operations.
- The basic guiding principle is for this humanitarian assistance to remain: "as civilian as possible, as military as necessary," in line with the UN "Oslo Guidelines" (revised) on humanitarian assistance. Specifically:
  - o The Fund consists entirely of voluntary donations and is established under the auspices of COMISAF, who is responsible for its sound financial management. NATO's North Atlantic Council, through the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR), is regularly updated on the implementation of the Fund.
  - o The Fund may be used only to finance rapid humanitarian assistance to the population directly affected by a military operation. Assistance should include, but not be limited to: food, water, shelter, essential medicines and essential repairs. No longer term reconstruction activities should be undertaken, but neither should immediate relief undermine longer term engagement.
  - o The implementation of on-going humanitarian measures should be transferred to civilian actors as soon as circumstances allow. The decision for this transfer is taken by COMISAF in consultation with the Senior Civilian Representative.
  - o Contributions as at **2 October** 2008:

<b>Contributions</b>	
Australia	€ 315,375
Bulgaria	€ 170,000
Czech Republic	€ <b>370,640</b>
Estonia	€ 124,895
Finland	€ 100,000

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Iceland	€ 100,000
Lithuania	€ 63,763
Netherlands	€ 300,000
USA	€ 1,300,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>€ 2,844,673</b>

- **Second Quarter 2008 Disbursements**

- o **Regional Command South:** One project worth € 32,215 was funded for building material, hired labour and assistance items.
- o **Regional Command West:** Four projects worth € 205,000 for village kits, hygiene kits, first aid kits, short term food supplies, crop replacement and refurbishment of wells damaged by ISAF operations as well as new wells for Afghans forced to leave their land.
- o **Regional Command North:** Two projects worth € 100,000 for small infrastructure damage and emergency assistance to affected locals.

- Total Disbursements Approved 1st Quarter 2008: € 407,205
- Total Disbursements Approved Since Inception: € 1,738,689

## 27. Hostages

*Any ISAF troop contributing nation whose citizen is kidnapped faces an extremely difficult situation.*

- The actions of one nation can have implications for other countries. This should be taken into account.
- The exchange of prisoners for hostages can be an incentive for criminals and extremists to take more hostages.
- Further discussion on this issue will take place among Allies.

## 28. Outsourcing of Intra-Theatre Airlift

- NATO outsourced airlift capability in support of the ISAF mission in early 2008. Contracted aircraft, which include helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, are used to transport supplies and equipment exclusively.
- Outsourcing routine logistics sustainment tasks frees military aviation assets to focus on combat manoeuvre missions.
- The decision to outsource is an opportunity to put in place a steady source of airlift that is capable of meeting the needs of the mission.
- It is nothing unusual in military operations to outsource support when it is advantageous to do so. It is important to bear in mind the great demands placed on our countries' forces, and not only in the NATO framework. Missions carried out by individual nations, the United

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Nations and/or the European Union involve calling on nations' assets, both manpower and equipment.

- **NOTE TO PAO:** Media queries on the contract are to be directed to JFC-B PAO.

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### **SECTION III – KEY POLITICAL MESSAGES**

#### **29. Why is NATO in Afghanistan?**

*NATO's presence in Afghanistan is in the best interests of the Afghan people, it is in the interest of our own peoples, and it is the right thing to do.*

- The security of NATO member states does not start at their borders.
- Terrorism and the drugs trade do not recognise territorial boundaries.
- As a failed state under the Taleban, Afghanistan exported terrorism, instability and crime to its neighbours and to the rest of the world.
- Today, NATO and the wider International Community stand by the democratically elected GIRoA and the people of Afghanistan to prevent this happening again.

#### **30. Legal Mandate**

*ISAF is mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Ten UN Security Council Resolutions – 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1659, 1707, 1776 and 1833 – relate to ISAF.*

- The ISAF mission was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference of December 2001 and its tasks are detailed in a Military Technical Agreement of January 2002 between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional Authority.
- ISAF was initially led by lead nations: the UK, followed by Turkey and the joint lead of Germany and the Netherlands.
- In August 2003, upon request of the UN and GIRoA, NATO took responsibility for ISAF.

#### **31. Legitimacy**

*NATO is in Afghanistan at the express wish of the democratically elected GIRoA and is widely supported by the Afghan population.*

- NATO/ISAF is in Afghanistan to support the legitimate Afghan authorities.
- As demonstrated in all opinion polls, there is strong support from the Afghan people for NATO/ISAF.

#### **32. Cooperation and Coordination as Guiding Principles**

*NATO plays a supporting role to the sovereign GIRoA. Under its UN mandate, NATO/ISAF works in close coordination with other international partners, including the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the G8 lead nations, the World Bank, the European Union and the development community to facilitate and foster the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact.*



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- ISAF communicates and coordinates with the ANA on a daily basis at multiple levels of command, from Ministry-level down to within individual Kandaks (battalions).
- NATO/ISAF and the SCR play a full role in the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). Co-chaired by the president's chief economic advisor and the UN's SRSG, this body comprises the key GIRoA and International Community actors charged with implementing the Afghanistan Compact. It has a number of functional working groups, which report regularly to the full JCMB.
- The Policy Action Group (PAG) was created in July 2006 at President Karzai's behest to focus Afghan and international effort on fostering improved security within the responsibility of Regional Command (South). The PAG is Afghan-led, is supported by NATO/ISAF, UNAMA, World Bank, EU and G8 lead nations and meets bi-weekly. It has 4 working groups on security, intelligence, strategic communications and R&D.
- The Paris Conference of 12 June 2008 reaffirmed the international efforts to implement the Afghanistan Compact.

**33. What does the Afghanistan Mission mean for the Alliance?**

*NATO's engagement in Afghanistan represents one of its toughest challenges. Currently, it is the Alliance's single most important issue and there is a complete determination to succeed.*

- NATO fully recognises that threats to our security are no longer limited to opposing state armies or marked by geographic boundaries. NATO will meet all security challenges with determination.
- NATO's engagement in Afghanistan is proof-positive of its transformation from a static, Cold-War orientation to an organisation capable of dynamic and flexible response and geared to meet the asymmetric challenges to the Allies and their shared values.
- The participation of all 26 Allies in the NATO/ISAF mission with troops on the ground clearly demonstrates the cohesion of the Alliance. Ten partner nations (ALB, AUT, AZE, CRO, FIN, FYROM, GEO, IRL, SWE, UKR) and **three** contact nations (AUS, NZL, SGP) and **two ICI countries (JOR, UAE)** also contribute forces to the operation, **bringing ISAF troop numbers in Afghanistan to roughly 50,700.**

**34. NATO's Enduring Commitment to Afghanistan**

*NATO and its partners in ISAF have the strategic patience and commitment necessary to see the mission in Afghanistan through to successful completion. The Afghan people can rely on NATO/ISAF to stay the course.*

- Afghanistan has suffered almost three decades of war, years of drought, and it continues to face challenges from enemies who seek to drag the country away from a peaceful, healthier and more prosperous future.
- Progress is steady, but there remains a long way to go.
- Roughly **50,700** service personnel from **41** countries are committed to the ISAF mission, which has steadily expanded to cover the whole country, including the most challenging areas.

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- NATO established the post of a Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) to further the Alliance's political engagement in Afghanistan. The SCR is not in the military chain of command but he/she has a close partnership with COM ISAF to maintain synergy between NATO's military and civilian efforts.
- The NATO-Afghanistan Declaration, signed in Kabul on 6 Sept 06, aims at building partnership and cooperation with Afghanistan to support and complement NATO/ISAF's operational role. This is indicative of NATO's enduring commitment to Afghanistan.

**35. Strategic Military End State**

**NOTE:** *Any decision on the end date/end state will be taken by the respective national and/or Alliance political committee. Under no circumstances should the mission end-date be a topic for speculation in public by any NATO/ISAF spokespeople.*

*There is no pre-defined end date for the mission, only an end state: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) able to provide security and sustain stability in Afghanistan without NATO/ISAF support.*

- The development of credible, professional and legitimate ANSF, combined with the desires of the Afghan government, will help to determine the exit timetable of NATO/ISAF forces.

**SECTION IV – BACKGROUND**

**36. Opposing Militant Forces (OMF) - Militants - Taliban Extremists**

**NOTE:** *See also Headline Messages, footnote no. 1*

*During the years of their rule the Taliban clearly demonstrated that they ruthlessly impose a regime based on extremism and intolerance which carries out the most egregious violations of human rights.*

- Not all violence can be attributed to the OMF / militants. Tribal conflict, land disputes, narco-trafficking and general criminal activity all contribute to the overall security challenge.
- Many of the rank and file OMF/ militants are locally recruited, although we are seeing an increase in the number of foreign fighters. Money is a primary motivation, as well as a warrior culture, and tribal rivalries. A minority core of OMF / militants, often with leadership roles, are ideologically motivated.
- The OMF / militants seek to:
  - o Undermine the authority of the legitimate GIRoA. Their campaign of terror attacks is designed to convince the people that their government cannot protect them.
  - o Inflict a steady toll of NATO/ISAF casualties so that the troop contributing nations lose the will to continue the fight and public support in their respective countries.
  - o Create the conditions for 'collateral damage', civilian casualties, by launching attacks on NATO/ISAF forces from behind a cloak of civilians.

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- o Prevent, through violence and intimidation, the Afghan people from benefiting from the R&D the GIRoA, NATO/ISAF and the International Community can bring. Increasingly, they seek to destroy new gains for the Afghan people by targeting roads, schools, bridges, etc.
- o Run a propaganda campaign designed to make themselves appear far more powerful than they really are and falsely depict what conditions were like, and would be like, under Taleban rule.
- OMF / militants will not defeat NATO/ISAF on the battlefield – every time they have tried their attacks have been decisively defeated with heavy losses to them – but they can be expected to continue to try to achieve localised success by attacking ISAF / ANSF outposts or small squads. Given their current military position, greater use of IEDs and suicide bombers is likely.
- Despite the OMF / militants propaganda, they are not capable of any coordinated effort against Kabul and do not have the capability to launch sustained attacks against it or isolate the city.
- As individuals, the OMF / militants leadership are wholly ill-equipped to govern in the best interest of the people of Afghanistan. They offer nothing in terms of R&D, economic progress, or improved healthcare or education. Their policies have been overwhelmingly rejected by Afghans, both through elections and in polls.

**37. The Afghanistan Compact**

*The Afghanistan Compact is a commitment to improve the lives of the Afghan people and to contribute to national, regional and global peace and security.*

- The Afghanistan Compact succeeds the Bonn Agreement process.
- It is the result of consultation between the GIRoA, the UN and the International Community.
- Launched on 31 Jan 06, the Afghanistan Compact presents a framework for cooperation between the International Community and the GIRoA, setting concrete benchmarks to be achieved within the following five years.

The process is coordinated and monitored by the JCMB.

**38. Joint Peace Jirga (JPJ)**

*The Joint Peace Jirga of 9-12 August 2007 marked a breakthrough in confidence building between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first time ever the two countries openly acknowledged their desire to strengthen their anti-terrorist efforts and cooperation is an important step.*

*The GIRoA proved capable of planning, preparing and then safely and securely conducting a complex international event. ISAF stood in support to the GIRoA.*

The text of the Joint Declaration reads as follows:

- (1) The Joint Peace Jirga strongly recognizes the fact that terrorism is a common threat to both countries and the war on terror should continue to be an integral part of the national policies and security strategies of both countries. The participants of this Jirga unanimously declare to an extended, tireless and persistent campaign against terrorism and further pledge that government and people of Pakistan and Afghanistan will not allow sanctuaries/training centers for terrorists in their respective countries.
- (2) The Joint Peace Jirga resolved to constitute a smaller Jirga, consisting of 25 prominent members from each side that is mandated to strive to achieve the following objectives:

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- a) Expedite the ongoing process of dialogue for peace and reconciliation with the opposition.
  - b) Holding of regular meetings in order to monitor and oversee the implementation of the decisions/recommendations of the Joint Peace Jirga.
  - c) Plan and facilitate convening of the next Joint Peace Jirgas.
  - d) Both countries will appoint 25 members each in the committee.
- (3) The Joint Peace Jirga once again emphasizes the vital importance of brotherly relations in pursuance of policies of mutual respect, non-interference and peaceful coexistence and recommends further expansion of economic, social, and cultural relations between the two countries.
- (4) Members of the Joint Peace Jirga in taking cognizance of the nexus between narcotics and terrorism condemn the cultivation, processing and trafficking of poppy and other illicit substances and call upon the two governments to wage an all out war against this menace. The Jirga takes note of the responsibilities of the international community in enabling Afghanistan to provide alternative livelihood to the farmers.
- (5) The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the support of the international community, should implement infrastructure, economic and social sector projects in the affected areas.
- (6) The comprehensive and important recommendations made by the five working committees of the Joint Peace Jirga for implementation form part and parcel of this Joint Declaration.

**39. The ASIA Foundation Survey – Afghanistan in 2007**

*Asia Foundation surveys have been conducted in 2004, 2006 and 2007. The latest survey, issued in September 2007, was conducted among 6,263 respondents from all 34 Provinces of Afghanistan providing a representative picture of Afghan public opinion.*

*There are further opinion polls available such as the one conducted by Manasia Research & Analysis MRA/CSTC-A Command in July/August 2007 or by Charney Research of New York on behalf of BBC, ABC and ARD in October/November 2007.*

*The ASIA Foundation Survey has been taken as an example on the grounds of statistical validity. PA staff should draw from these polls as required. Digital versions of the polls may be obtained through HQ NATO, PDD MOC. Key points from the ASIA foundation survey:*

- The mood of Afghans continues to be optimistic, with 42% saying that things are moving in the right direction (44% in 2006). 24% think that the country is moving in the wrong direction and 25% have mixed feelings.
- Reconstruction cited as single biggest reason for country going in right direction (39%), followed by good security (34%).
- In 2006, rebuilding of the country was identified as only the 4<sup>th</sup> most important reason to believe the country was headed in the right direction. This underscores the good pace at which the reconstruction of the country is taking place.
- Great deal or fair amount of confidence in institutions such as the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police (both more than 80%).
- 90% feel the ANA to be honest and fair with the Afghan people. 89% believe the ANA helps to improve security.

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- 66% felt that security in their area was good or quite good, and 50% said they rarely or never feared for their own or their family's safety.

**40. Facts and Figures**

- Commander ISAF, General David D. McKiernan, US Army, assumed command on 3 June 2008.
- **Total Number of ISAF Troops – Circa 50,700.**
- **Forty-one nations** - Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Turkey, Ukraine, **United Arab Emirates**, United Kingdom and the United States of America.
- One additional nation (United Arab Emirates, UAE) has forces deployed with ISAF, but it has not yet completed the formal process by which the NATO Council approves its participation in ISAF.

**NOTE for PAO:** Jordan has requested not to be mentioned as an ISAF member state in the public domain.

- Switzerland withdrew from ISAF on 1 March 2008. Singapore and Ukraine have completed the formal process to join ISAF. Thus the total number of nations participating in ISAF has risen from 39 to 40.
- 12 nations are represented in Regional Command (North), 12 nations in RC(E), **18** nations in RC(S), 11 nations in RC(W) and 16 nations in RC (C).
- 26 PRTs: 5 in RC(N), 4 in RC(W), 4 in RC(S) and 13 in RC(E).
- **ISAF Killed in Action (KIA) and Non Battle Death (NBD) by year as at 18 September 2008:**
  - o 2002      0 KIA and    15 NBD
  - o 2003      6 KIA and    2 NBD
  - o 2004      3 KIA and    4 NBD
  - o 2005      4 KIA and    19 NBD
  - o 2006     58 KIA and    12 NBD
  - o 2007     143 KIA and  15 NBD
  - o **2008     143 KIA and  9 NBD**
- Afghanistan Profile: 650,000 sq km. Population 31.1 million (approx). Main ethnic groups: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%. Religions: Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%. Literacy: 36%.

**41. Progress Since the Fall of the Taleban**

- **Security**
  - o More than **66,000 ANA** plus 78,000 ANP assigned.
  - o More than 60,000 members of Illegally Armed Groups have been disarmed and more than 100,000 weapons have been collected.

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- **Governance**

- o Presidential, Parliamentary and Provincial elections have taken place and women are now sitting in the Afghan Parliament. 28% of the MPs of the Lower House are female. Legitimate and representative government is now in place.
- o An estimated 4.8 million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) have returned home.
- o Poppy-free provinces in 2006: 6, in 2007: 14, planned by the end of 2008: 22 (out of 34).

- **Reconstruction & Development**

- o The Afghan **economy** grew by 29% in 2002, 16% in 2003, 8% in 2004, 14 % each in 2005 and 2006 and 13% in 2007. The fiscal year 2008/09 foresees a similar annual rate of growth.
- o More than 4.5 million cell phone subscribers, up from zero in 2001.
- o There are 300 newspapers, 90 radio stations and 14 TV stations countrywide.
- o Current estimates are that there are now 661 basic **health** centres, 413 community medical centres, 66 district hospitals and 33 provincial hospitals.
- o An estimated 35,000 children who would otherwise have died are alive thanks to the immunisation programme and approximately 83% of the population now have access to healthcare as opposed to an estimated 8% in 2001.
- o UNICEF efforts to improve neo and post-natal care have resulted in a 26% decline of infant mortality and a 22% decline of under-5 mortality between 2002 and 2007. This means that 85,000 babies and children under age of 5 did not die in 2007.
- o Actually 350,000 children are vaccinated against polio
- o Over 2,000 **schools** have been built or refurbished since 2001; there are now 13 state universities, 8 other state institutions of higher education and a dozen private universities with 48,000 students countrywide. 20% of the students are female. For Kabul, these figures include 5 institutions of higher education, 14 faculties and more than 10,000 students.
- o On 22 March, the school year 2008/9 started with roughly 44,000 trained personnel teaching 6.2 million children (plus 0.5 million as compared to 2007/8), 40% of which are girls. Under the Taleban, only 1.0 million boys were in school and girls were prohibited from attending.
- o 23 active teacher training colleges have enrolled around 9,500 students.
- o Over 14,500km of regional **highways** have been improved or asphalted since 2001 (as of July 06) with an additional 530 km scheduled to be completed in 2008.
- o 1,983 km of the Ring Road Network, i.e. 59%, has been reconstructed so far.

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